of the Philippines
[G.R. No. 158896. October
petitioner vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
This is a petition for review on certiorari
of the decision
of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January
2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco (“respondent Manuel”).
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco
(“Petitioner Juanita”) and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on
27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After
discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple
decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24)
years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration
of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner
Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited
an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated
by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly
complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his
elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking
like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office
and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all
for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal
Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around
the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less
about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral
support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before
marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness for what
she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents since
childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if
treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the
emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and
suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita
alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal
home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so
that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and
mother; that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and
family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his
endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy
family and had a happy childhood contrary to what was stated in the
In the pre-trial order,
the parties only stipulated on the following:
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
2. That they have one son who is already 20
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand and elaborated on the
allegations in his petition. He testified that his parents never approved of
his marriage as they still harbored hope that he would return to the
The early years of their marriage were difficult years as they had a hard
time being accepted as husband and wife by his parents and it was at this
period that his wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable and
to him and his parents.
She was also obsessive about cleanliness which became the common source of
He, however, characterized their union as happy during that period of time
in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing
their new house.
In 1981, when he became busy with law school and with various community
organizations, it was then that he felt that he and his wife started to
He then narrated incidents during their marriage that were greatly
embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with
an elderly neighbor;
when she would visit him in his office and remark that the curtains were
already dirty or when she kicked a trash can across the room or when she
threw a ballpen from his table;
when she caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened while he was away;
when she confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of
having an affair with him;
and other incidents reported to him which would show her jealous nature.
Money matters continued to be a source of bitter quarrels.
Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was not able to celebrate his
appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did not approve it, ostensibly for
lack of money, but she was very generous when it came to celebrations of
their parish priest.
Respondent Manuel then denied that he was a womanizer
or that he had a mistress.
Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their conjugal properties and
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel’s Clerk of
Court, testified that petitioner Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuel’s
But when she was there, she would call witness to complain about the
curtains and the cleanliness of the office.
One time, witness remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging through respondent
Manuel’s drawer looking for his address book while the latter was in Subic
attending a conference.
When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer she called witness,
telling the latter that she was looking for the telephone number of
respondent’s hotel room in Subic. A process server was requested by
petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper. When the
locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked
drawer. On another occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness
testified that she heard petitioner Juanita remark to respondent Manuel “sino
bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa labas?”
As his third witness, respondent Manuel
presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional qualifications as a
psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita.
From her psychiatric evaluation,
Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita
Victoria Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is a
partner relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain the
marital bond with love, support and understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in
the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of both spouses.
Manuel and Juanita had engaged themselves in a defective communication
pattern which is characteristically negative and deformed. This affected
their competence to maintain the love and respect that they should give to
a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who are expected to use
healthy strategies to solve their disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita
would be derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive and
obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance and suppression. In his
effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego to cover up for
his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the detrimental
effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the marriage.
Both spouses, who display narcissistic psychological repertoire (along with
their other maladaptive traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be
responsive and sensitive) to each other’s needs and feelings. The
matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage.
Manuel and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity to
satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing
of their patterns of maladaptive traits, which warrant the diagnosis of
personality disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per
DSM IV criteria) will bring about more emotional mishaps and
psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits which were in existence before
the marriage will tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery.
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied
respondent Manuel’s allegations. She insisted that they were a normal couple
who had their own share of fights; that they were happily married until
respondent Manuel started having extra-marital affairs
which he had admitted to her.
Petitioner Juanita professed that she would wish to preserve her marriage
and that she truly loved her husband.
She stated further that she has continuously supported respondent Manuel,
waiting up for him while he was in law school to serve him food and drinks.
Even when he already filed the present case, she would still attend to his
She remembered that after the pre-trial, while they were in the hallway,
respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new family.
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a
psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel,
testified that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita,
the results of which were embodied in his report. Said report stated in
Based on the clinical interviews and the
results of the psychological tests, respondent Juanita Victoria
Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature, conservative, religious and
highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more than enough psychological
potentials for a mutually satisfying long term heterosexual relationship.
Superego is strong and she is respectful of traditional institutions of
society like the institution of marriage. She was also found to be a loving,
nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is capable of enduring severe
environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is reality-oriented
and therefore capable of rendering fair and sound decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found
the respondent to be psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic
and essential obligations of marriage.
a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the Siayngcos as the
ideal couple, sweet to each other.
The couple would religiously attend prayer meetings in the community.
Both were likewise leaders in their community.
Witness then stated that she would often go to the house of the couple and,
as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent Manuel there.
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied
respondent Manuel’s petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
petitioner Juanita holding in part that:
The asserted psychological incapacity of the
defendant is not preponderantly supported in evidence. The couple [was]
happily married and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a
son. Their life together continued years thereafter in peace and prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been
critical, depressed and obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties’
relationship sometime in the early 90’s when the defendant-wife started
receiving letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy.
The present state of our laws on marriage does
not favor knee-jerk responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on
marital relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed, due
to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures to
her husband. But, as our laws now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is
not the remedy in such cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not
look at a marital partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he
or she sometimes may sound like a firetruck.
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was
denied in an order dated 04 May 2001.
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed
the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia
finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the
Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.
The report clearly explained the root cause of
the alleged psychological incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant
Juanita. It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and defendant.
That is – a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense
of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
interest in each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go
a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely
not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship
with love “amore gignit amorem”, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
compromise conscious of its value as a sublime social institution (Chi
Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed
relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less, but
reverse and set aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is
entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity, not only of defendant but also of himself.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING
TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID
DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IV.IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The Court’s Ruling
Our pronouncement in
Republic v. Dagdag
is apropos. There, we held that whether or not psychological
incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity
of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must
be closely scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as there can be
no case that is on “all fours” with another. This, the Court of Appeals did
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our
ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its factual milieu
with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein,
despite sharing the same bed from the time of their wedding night on 22 May
1988 until their separation on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The
perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We
sustained the wife for the reason that an essential marital obligation under
the Family Code is procreation such that “the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.”
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for
procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather, we have here a case of a husband
who is constantly embarrassed by his wife’s outbursts and overbearing ways,
who finds his wife’s obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his
wallet “irritants” and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for
his person and his position as a Judge. In our book, however, these
inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a
case against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
It was in
Santos v. Court of Appeals
where we declared that “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the
Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Republic v. Court of Appeals
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the
foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,”
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state. The Family Code
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the
complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the “time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I
do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass,
we now resolve the issue of whether or not the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against
petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in
the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of
married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.With
this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in
Republic v. Court of Appeals
that the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the
plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent
Manuel’s own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the
person in the best position to gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled
the essential marital obligations of marriage:
She talked about her spouse, “My husband is
kind, a good provider, cool, intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at
gastador In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of him
whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs because he wants to
have a child. I believe that our biggest problem is not having a child. It
is his obsession to have a child with his girl now. He started his
relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them together in the car. I
think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file the petition.” She
feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic] “paulit-ulit,”
but, that she still is willing to pursue it.
x x x.
Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really
psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her, “You and Jeremy
should give me a chance to have a new family.” She answered and said, “Ikaw
tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin.”
What emerges from the psychological report of
Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties and their
witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent
Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.Sexual
infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code.
It must be shown that respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation
of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state
and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and
blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: “I had
[extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in
favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack
of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her
outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his
salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave
psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these “defects”
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by
respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated
to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.
The psychological report of respondent Manuel’s
witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other hand, does not help his case any. Nothing
in there supports the doctor’s conclusion that petitioner Juanita is
psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly shows
that the root cause of petitioner Juanita’s behavior is traceable – not from
the inception of their marriage as required by law – but from her
experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws’ disapproval of her as
they wanted their son to enter the priesthood,
her husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him,
and her inability to conceive.
Dr. Garcia’s report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew
professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to
the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and
togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself
during his direct examination.
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced
by both parties, we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcos’s life and
have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out
of love and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a
null and void marriage. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and
“conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.As
we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time
the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and
misery respondent Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled, so to
speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are
situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the
specific answers to every individual problem.
the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July 2003
of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is
reinstated and given full force and effect. No costs.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria Martinez, Callejo,
and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Per Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria (Chairman) and concurred in by Justices
Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong.
Penned by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
RTC Record, p. 36.
TSN, 07 October 1998, p. 10.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20-22.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 43-44.
TSN, 27 January 1999, p. 3.
TSN, 25 November 1998, p. 15.
Id. at 9-13.
Id. at 14.
TSN, 10 May 1999, p. 5.
Exh. “M” for petitioner Manuel, respondent herein.
Records, pp. 114-115.
TSN, 29 March 2000, pp. 5-6.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 22.
TSN, 21 June 2000, p. 5.
14 July 2000, p. 4.
Records, pp. 205-206.
No. 119190, 16 January 1997, 266 SCRA 324.
Rollo, p. 43.
G.R. No. 109975, 09 February 2001, 351 SCRA 425.
G.R. No. 112019, 04 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755.
G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
pp. 209-212. The above pronouncements have been modified by the provisions
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages which took effect on 15 March
2003, particularly Section 2(d) thereof which provides:
(d) What to allege. – A petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of
the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the
time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
Previously, the Committee on Revision of the
Rules of Court submitted the “Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders and its Rationale” enunciated among other things, that
3. Attachment of expert opinion to petitions
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 is
dispensed with. Instead, the court shall determine the advisability of
expert testimony during the pre-trial conference.
xxx xxx xxx
12. The certification of the Solicitor General
required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay.
Sec. 12, Art. II, Constitution.
Dr. Garcia’s psychological report, Exh. “M” (RTC Record at 110).
See Art. 68, Family Code.
Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 42;
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, 08 December 1999, 320
SCRA 76; Dedel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151867, 29 January 2004.
note 46 at 111.
Marcos v. Marcos, supra, note 43 at 764.
RTC Record at 169.
note 46 at 102-103.
Q: Did your wife agree to your going to law school?
A: I did not encounter any objection
Q: And what was the
marriage like during this time when you were attending law school?
A: I started feeling that
we somehow begun (sic) drifting apart because I was developing a new field
of interest in the legal profession. I was occupied with leading various
community organization (sic) including homeowners association. Maybe that
was when we started drifting apart. (TSN, 07 October 1998, at 22)
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 44 at 207.
Supra, note 43 at 765.
Dedel v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 50, citing Santos v.
Court of Appeals, supra, note 42, at 36.